After several centuries of casting and counting ballots, it’s shocking that we still haven’t mastered what seems to be a simple task. But anyone who lived through the 2000 presidential election, in which a mishmash of flawed voting machines, contradictory county procedures, and unclear state laws in Florida led to the least reliable outcome in history, knows that 21st century voting is no better than the era when we shouted out our votes at the courthouse steps. After 2000, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was passed by Congress to help rid us of hanging chads and stolen ballots by subsidizing e-voting machines. But, it turns out, the 50,000 e-machines turned out to be even more of a headache than the chads, with widespread reports of crashes, lost votes, flipped votes, and even hacking. Voting and vote counting since then has been more than a little bit interesting.
After almost of decade of voting reform and increased scrutiny, have we come far enough in safeguarding the vote? The answer is a resounding question mark. Though the real answer will come on November 4, many parts of the country have made great strides to fix the problems caused by electronic voting machines. The great solution? Send the machines to the dump. According to CBS news, just one-third of Americans will vote on electronic machines. Fifty-five percent of the electorate will rely on a relatively old technology, optical scan machines, which leave a paper trail.In fact, the states with the biggest voting headaches—Florida, where e-machines dropped 15 percent of the Sarasota vote several years ago, and Ohio, the e-voting problem child of 2004—have made the biggest steps back. Last year, the Sunshine state unplugged 30,000 touch screen e-voting machines in favor of optical scanners with a recountable paper trail. In Ohio, where questions about touch-screen voting set off investigations after the 2004 election, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner reviewed the state’s entire voting system and forced its largest counties to abandon e-voting. This year, she has printed enough paper ballots to allow voting to continue if there are any glitches or irregularities with the machines. Other states that have devolved from e-voting to paper include California, where all but three counties now use optical scan machines, Iowa, which replaced its machines in April, and New Mexico which is now all paper.
But that leaves 24 states that still rely, at least partially, on e-voting. Just a few days from the election, tests have found problems in Texas, West Virginia (Obama votes flipped for McCain), and Tennessee (McCain votes flipped for Obama). Those are minor, fixable problems, but multiply them by hundreds of counties and they become significant. The possibility of a malicious hack is also very real. Last spring, Princeton professor Andrew Appel showed how a Sequoia voting machine could be hacked and loaded with vote-stealing software in less than seven minutes.
According to Michael Shamos at Carnegie Mellon, one in ten voting machines goofs up during any given election. Back-up systems, like simply printing a vote, have proven ineffective if the printers jam (and beg the question, why not simply use paper in the first place) or if the rolls of paper are improperly installed by less-than-tech-savvy poll workers.
The brief heyday of e-voting is, by most major indicators, over. The manufacturers of the machines report that no new counties have recently switched over to touch-screen voting. Last year, senator Sheldon Whitehouse Bill Nelson submitted legislation that would outlaw e-voting in Federal elections by 2012 and would provide a $1 billion fund a return to optical scanners. The days of the e-vote are numbered. Then again, the saga of electronics and the electorate is far from over. If you thought e-voting was controversial, just wait until Internet voting is up and running.
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There are a couple of things here that nobody seems to discuss.
1. How bad is the accuracy? Presidential elections involve huge numbers, and here were reports of posible errors. However,there was never any formal scientific analysis of the probable error size to my knowledge. There's lot of arm waving, but nobody says "we've got to do better than the 0.1% error rate we had in the 2000 election. (And it may actually be nearly impossible with such a large scale process)
2. There were other 'errors' attributed to ballot design -- again nobody measured the extent. For some reason, ballot design is no longer discusse. '
3. It's far from amazing that the new digital machines have some issues. I'm sure that this was another 'gotta do something right now' deal ( again, without a clear handle on the size of the problem). I don't know that a clear objective was presented to the vendors other than 'digital' ( because it's automatically accurate). I'm guessing this because goverment units are aparently stuck with unsatisfactory machines. Apparently proof of accuracy was not a conract requirement.
Finally, I'll say that the real issues in 2000 were the closeness of the race plus the drama of the Florida 'turnaround'. The election could have had the most accurate count ever, but those 2 things caused the process to be closely scrutinized. The scrutiny found that, as always, there were errors. They may or may not have impacted the count, and they may have been balanced by other errors in other places, it's hard to say.
I've heard of voting machines that don't even print a receipt of who you voted for. Who thought up this design? I'm all for a paperless society, but some things scream for redundancy! A simple receipt for the voter and one for the registrar seems like it would be a major requirement. Barcode them, and in the event of a recount you could simply scan them. It might not solve tamper problems or paper jams, but it would provide peace of mind. If people working cash registers can switch out a paper roll, it can’t be rocket science. I’m all for advancing the way we vote. Whether it be voter cards that are issued with a chip in them, secure web sites, or whatever… Let’s just use some common sense. Please!
The requirements for a good voting system are not as simple or straightforward as one might think at first. As an example, if the voting machine prints out a receipt for the voter, the voter could be subject to bribery and/or coersion. Without a receipt as proof, no third party can be sure that you voted the way they wanted you to. That's an important reason why no receipts can be provided.
You're saying that providing a receipt for someone could be detrimental, because it could be used as proof to a 3rd party that you voted for someone specific. I understand your point. Someone might put a gun to your head and say, "Vote for _______, or I'm going to kill you”, and the same goes for bribery. That is a good point. Maybe this would be a better solution. Vote on an electronic machine, print a single receipt for the voter (so they can verify that the machine processed the vote correctly). Then require that the receipt be deposited in a ballet box for redundancy. The person would have that “warm and fuzzy”, and you would have a viable back up in case of machine failure or recount. I would still bar-code the receipt somehow for easy scanning in the event they had to be used.
Having an electronic voting machine print out a paper receipt for the voter to check before it's deposited into a "ballot box" is indeed a good idea. Indeed, that's the basis of what's called a "Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail," or "VVPAT." Computer Scientist Rebecca Mercuri has been promoting this concept for many years: see http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html for information.
Most people who have studied the various alternatives for voting end up favoring the simplicity of optically-scanned paper ballots over any type of electronic voting machines. With paper ballots, you have the advantage of a built-in paper audit trail. In addition, many people can mark their ballots simultaneously at the polling place--a paper-ballot system is much less likely to produce long waits on election day than one that depends on a fixed number of expensive touch-screen machines.
Electronic machines can be used by some handicapped voters who can't mark paper ballots without assistance. But even here, the machine can print out a paper ballot to be scanned along with the ordinary hand-marked ballots.
As an election judge in suburban Cook County Illinois I can speak for the way things are done here. There is a choice of optical scan ballot and touch screen voting. The touch screen includes a printer that prints a paper ballot that the voter reviews. Before the voter leaves the machine, the ballot is rolled off the screen and retained inside the machine. The paper in the touch screen machines is the actual offical ballot, and is treated the same way, with the same protections, as the optical scan ballots. One of the election judges in each precinct receives extra training on the machines that includes how to change the tapes if necessary. The touch screens have features that allow unassisted voting by the blind, and those who can't use their hands (sip and puff) or both.
As an election judge in suburban Cook County Illinois I can speak for the way things are done here. There is a choice of optical scan ballot and touch screen voting. The touch screen includes a printer that prints a paper ballot that the voter reviews. Before the voter leaves the machine, the ballot is rolled off the screen and retained inside the machine. The paper in the touch screen machines is the actual offical ballot, and is treated the same way, with the same protections, as the optical scan ballots. One of the election judges in each precinct receives extra training on the machines that includes how to change the tapes if necessary. The touch screens have features that allow unassisted voting by the blind, and those who can't use their hands (sip and puff) or both.
The whole american voting system is too complex.
I'm from Canada. The way it is done here is there is a ballot with the candidates names on it. You put an x beside the guy you want to vote for and put it in a cardboard box. The votes are then counted by hand. No touch screens, no optical scanners.
By the way, we just had an election. Called in September, held in October. Did anybody notice?
How I commented on the photo album, In Brazil all the country wide elections are done, for many years, on a 100% electronic system. The paper voting system is not regularly used anymore, and its used only in case of malfunction of the voting machine, that is something rare to happen.
The result of the election of the president, for example, is known few hours after the ending of the voting. All the votes are directed to a country wide network, that informs the total of votes from all the cities and all the states of the country.
The best of all the electronic voting system, is the time between the ending of the voting and the final result. Few weeks ago we had elections of the mayors and of the city counclimen of all the cities of the country. In some cities, large ones, the result was informed just a few minutes after the ending of the voting.
Oh... the machine can be operated by the blind without any assistance, and at the end of the voting, we receive a receipt that confirms that you voted (in Brazil the voting is mandatory), without informing on who you voted, of course.
Ps.: Sorry for the "repost"